

The Baltic Shield

How Nato's Front Line is Rewriting the Rules of Defence

A new reality on NATO's 'front line'

On 7 May, a Ukrainian drone, which had been knocked off course by Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, struck at an oil storage facility in Rēzekne (Latvia). On 19 May, a Romanian F-16 aircraft, as part of a NATO patrol, shot down a drone over Estonia. The very next day, Lithuania declared an alert over a drone threat for the first time since the start of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. Residents of eastern Lithuania received a warning that the civilian population (including the president and prime minister) should take shelter due to a suspicious drone coming from Belarus. At the same time, sirens sounded in the border regions of Latvia and Estonia. The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry directly accused Russia of deliberately diverting Ukrainian drones into Baltic airspace as an act of chaos.

Three incidents in two weeks have stripped away the pretence of accident and demonstrated a new reality. The drone over Rēzekne was not heading in the right direction, was not aimed at any legitimate target, and was not intended for the Baltics, yet it was precisely this drone that demonstrated just how blurred the line is becoming between 'a war somewhere out there' and a war on one's front doorstep. When a NATO member state's defence system forces its top officials to take shelter, old security paradigms collapse. For the Baltic states, these events marked the beginning of a test of their own preparation and faith in the alliance.

The anatomy of vulnerability

The strategic vulnerability of the Baltic states has several aspects. One of these is demographic – the city of Narva. Located right on the border with Russia, it has remained under Russian influence, and its population is Russian speaking, which makes it not a traditional military goal, but a platform for hybrid expansion. Information campaigns about 'rights abuses' and the simplification of the process for obtaining Russian passports are designed for the long term. The destabilisation of the situation around Narva does not take the form of typical aggression; it does not cross any formal threshold for the invocation of NATO's Article 5, but it is slowly undermining Estonia's internal cohesion. This is a threat that cannot be overcome by military force alone – only through integration and security policies.

Another major vulnerability is geographical. The Suwalki Corridor – a thin strip of land between the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation and Belarus, linking the Baltic states with the rest of NATO via Poland – remains the alliance's weakest link. If cut off, three countries would be effectively isolated from land-based supplies - and it is a vulnerability that cannot simply be cast in stone. After 2022, the doctrine for defending this vulnerable point changed. The original rationale for NATO's forward presence, established after 2014, was based on the principle that « if aggression were to target the forces of several Alliance countries on the border, this would trigger a full-scale war, and the territories would subsequently be recaptured by the main contingent». The horrors of Bucha and Mariupol completely shattered this concept. The former Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, [stated](#) at the time that under NATO's old doctrine, her country would simply have been wiped off the face of the earth, and there would have been no one left to liberate it after 180 days. The 'surrender and retake' plan became morally and politically unacceptable. The Alliance made the transition to a forward defence model: deploying brigades instead of battalions, pre-positioning heavy equipment, and establishing infrastructure designed to hold territory from the very first day of an invasion.

The Baltic Defence Line

During the early years following 2022, the Baltic states had viewed events within Ukraine as something happening elsewhere; today, however, that sense of distance has disappeared. The Ukrainian experience is no longer just being studied, but is being replicated, adapted and incorporated into the foundations of a new defence architecture.

The Baltic Defence Line is not merely a line on a map linking three countries along their borders with Russia and Belarus, but a system of fortifications extending up to 50 km inland. Anti-tank ditches, concrete 'dragon's teeth', underground bunkers for personnel and prepared caponiers for heavy artillery are a direct reflection of Ukrainian fortifications in the Donbas and Kharkiv regions.

The total length of the three countries' eastern land corridor is hundreds of kilometres, whilst the combined population of the Baltic states is less than six million. It is mathematically impossible to cover every metre with personnel. That is precisely why, in December 2025, the Baltic states [announced](#) their withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. This is not only a diplomatic decision but a strategic calculation: without minefields, the enemy can find a way round; with mines, every metre becomes a deadly threat to personnel

and heavy equipment. Mines cannot replace an army, but they will significantly enhance the effectiveness of every soldier.

In June 2026, at the Pabrade training ground – 15 kilometres from the border with Belarus – the Bundeswehr's 45th Armoured Brigade conducted its first full-scale combat exercises. Brigade Commander Christoph Huber [commented](#): the brigade is preparing not for past wars, but for possible future scenarios of conflict and combat operations.

The year 2027 is a critical point to which the timetables for the deployment of allied forces, the pace of fortification construction and the speed at which lessons from Ukraine are being learnt are tied. If these factors align, NATO's eastern flank will be definitively transformed from a 'vulnerable spot' into the Alliance's most militarised and best-prepared line of defence. Otherwise, the vulnerability will remain a vulnerability, and it cannot simply be cast in stone.